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CHAPTER 4 
Contracts 
FREDERICK M. HART 
§4.1. Introduction. None of the contract cases decided during the 
1963 SuRVEY year requires extensive comment. This conclusion prob-
ably reflects an approval of the manner in which the Supreme .Judicial 
Court handled the many issues presented by litigants. In reviewing 
a year's judicial production, it is easier to get excited about a decision 
that one disapproves. 
One trend is worthy of note. From the cases discussed in this and 
other chapters, it is apparent that the Court is becoming more sophis~ 
ticated in its understanding and use of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.1 
§4.2. Draws against commission. In Perma-Home Corp. v. Nigro1 
the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the question of 
whether a salesman is required to repay money drawn against his 
commissions when the draw exceeds commissions earned at the time 
his employment is terminated. The defendant had agreed to supply 
the names of prospective customers to the plaintiff in return for a 
commission of IO per cent on all sales ultimately made. The defend-
ant was to receive a draw against commissions in the amount of SIOO 
per week. According to the facts, no express agreement to repay any 
of the advances was made by the defendant. \'Vhen the defendant's 
employment was terminated. he had drawn considerably more than he 
had earned under the commission arrangement, and this action was 
brought to recover the difference. 
The Court adopted what it found to be the prevailing rule that "in 
absence of an express or implied agreement to repay any excess of 
advances over the commissions earned, the emplm·er may not recover 
from the employee the amount of the excess." 2 The rationale of this 
rule is that the employer and employee are viewed as partaking in a 
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§4.1. 1 See cases dilCU&'led In §4.!I, Chapter 6, and §9.2 infra. 
§4.2. 1196! Mass. Adv. Sh. 977, 191 N.E.2d 745. 
2 Id. at 980, 191 N.E.2d at 747. 
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joint venture and it is assumed that some of the risk is assumed by the 
employer. 
The decision should be compared with the earlier case of Theriault 
v. E. L. King & Co.,s which involved a written contract whereunder 
the employee was to be paid a commission on all sales made by him. 
The term of the contract was one year and the contract provided that 
the employee was to be advanced a drawing account of $100 per week, 
payable against commissions earned. The employer failed to pay the 
draw for a substantial number of weeks and at the end of the year 
an action was commenced for its recovery. The Court held that the 
employer was not obligated to pay the employee the weekly payment 
at the end of the term when there was no showing that the commissions 
earned were equal to or exceeded the draw. The parties did not intend 
that a minimum salary was guaranteed to the employee. The Court 
said that the "advancements have resemblance to a loan which was 
to be repaid the defendant at the termination of the agreement to the 
extent or amount it was in excess of commissions then earned." • 
This language was correctly characterized as dicta by the Court in 
Perma-Home, but the two cases are nevertheless difficult to harmonize. 
In both, commissions were less than the draw. In one, Theriault, the 
employer failed to pay the draw and the Court found that he was 
correct. In the other, Perma-Home, the draw was paid and the Court 
found that the employer had no right to recover that part of it which 
was in excess of the commissions. If, as the Court reasons in Perrna-
H ome, the arrangement is in the nature of a joint venture in which 
the risk is to be shared, it would appear that the employer's contractual 
obligation to advance money each week is his contribution to the 
venture and that it should be paid irrespective of whether the expected 
gains are realized. On the other hand, if the Court's characterization 
of the transaction in Theriault as a loan is basically sound, recovery 
should be allowed against the employee at the end of the term when 
the draw paid exceeds the commissions earned. 
In spite of the apparent inconsistency between the opinions, the re-
sult reached in each seems to be right. Perh~ps this is because the 
plaintiff does not make an effective showing in either case that the 
status quo ought to be disturbed. However, if one must choose be-
tween the two opinions, Perma-Home appears the better, and the one 
more in line with current authority. 
§4.3. Provisions prohibiting assignments. Two cases decided dur-
ing the 1963 SURVEY year reaffirmed the validity of clauses prohibiting 
assignments. Although the enactment of the Uniform Commercial 
Code will affect the result in both cases, they are worthy of note as 
examples of the basic approach of the Massachusetts courts in this 
area. 
R 282 Mas.,. 109, 184 N.E. !186 (1935). 
4 Id. at ll2, 184 N.E. at !187. 
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McLaughlin tJ. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co.t involved 
a dispute between a trustee in bankruptcy and the assignor of contracts 
over the right to money owing the bankrupt-assignor. The bankrupt 
had entered into several construction contracts with the Telephone 
Company, each of which contained a clause providing: "Neither party 
... shall assign the contract ... without the written consent of the 
other, nor shall the contractor [the bankrupt] assign any moneys due or 
to become due to him hereunder, without the previous written consent 
of [the Telephone Company]." Subsequently, the bankrupt delivered 
to the United States Trust Company account receivable assignment 
forms purporting to assign his contract rights to the bank as security 
for loans. When the Trust Company instructed the Telephone Com-
pany that ·it was an assignee and should be paid, the Telephone Com-
pany objected to the assignment and refused the demand. Upon the 
commencement of this action for a declaratory judgment to determine 
whether the trustee in bankruptcy or the Trust Company had superior 
rights to the money ultimately becoming due from performance of the 
contracts, the Telephone Company paid the money into court with 
the consent of all parties. 
The trustee argued that the assignments were ineffective as against 
him because of the nonassignment clause, and claimed a right to the 
fund under Sections 70(a) and 60 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The 
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the validity of the nonassignment 
clauses, but held that the prohibition was for the benefit of the Tele-
phone Company and did not prevent an assignee from acquiring rights 
against the assignor. By implication, the Court also held that the 
assignments were perfected for the purposes of Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act as soon as they were made. 
Much of the Court's opinion is rendered obsolete by the Uniform 
Commercial Code,2 but there is one point that must be considered in 
future transactions. In the course of the opinion, the Court was re-
quired to decide whether the assignment was intended to cover only 
money owing at the time of the assignment or also money to become 
due in the _future. Although the form signed by the contractor used 
the term "contracts," it also stated that the accounts were "owing to" 
the debtor. Adopting a narrow construction of the agreement, the 
Court held that it covered only those owing to the contractor at the 
time of the assignments. Since Section 9-106 of the Uniform Com· 
mercial Code separately defines accounts and contract rights, it is likely 
that the same result would be reached under the Code. The case indi-
cates that any security agreement that is designed to cover both should 
clearly describe the collateral as "all present and future contract rights 
and accounts of the assignor." a 
§4.3. 1345 Mass. 555, 188 N.E.2d 552 (1963). 
2 See Willier and Hart, Forms and Procedures Under the Uniform Commercial 
Code pars. 91.20, 91.21 (1963). 
3 5 B.C. Ind.&: Com. L. Rev. I ii (1963). 
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The validity of contractual provisions forbidding assignments was 
also at issue in Security National Bank of Springfield v. General Motors 
Corp.4 The Court held that an assignee took no rights as against the 
debtor when the contract provided that the creditor "shall not transfer 
or assign nor attempt to transfer this Agreement or any right or obli-
gation hereunder." The decision is consistent with the McLaughlin 
case, but is contrary to the Uniform Commercial Code.11 
§4.4. Finders' fees. When one merely brings to the attention of 
another a possibility for making a profit, his right to recover compen-
sation for this service is nebulous at best. Many of the cases in this 
general area involve the presentation of "new ideas" to a going corpo-
ration. Davidson v. Robiel presented another typical factual situation 
of this nature. The defendant had told the plaintiff to "keep his eyes 
open for deals," as the defendant was interested in them, and had 
promised that he would "take care" of the plaintiff. When the plain-
tiff informed the defendant of an opportunity to buy stock in a close 
corporation, the defendant promised to pay him lO per cent of any 
profit he might make on the deal. The defendant subsequently pur-
chased it and sold it some years later at a substantial profit. In this 
action the plaintiff sought compensation for having brought the pos-
sibility of the deal to the defendant's attention. 
Although the Supreme Judicial Court found that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to prove either that the plaintiff was a broker, in the 
sense that he was hired to negotiate, or that he had been the effective 
cause of arranging the transaction, recovery by the plaintiff was af-
firmed on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to prove an 
express contract. The most notable feature of the case is the willing-
ness of the Court to leave the question of whether a contract existed to 
the jury, even though the evidence was "imprecise" and "scanty." The 
arrangement between the plaintiff and the defendant is of the type that 
is as likely to be informally stated as it is to be written, and the Court's 
opinion is highly commendable. 
§4.5. Promise to pay debt discharged in bankruptcy. Howard v. 
Zilch 1 presented a novel fact situation raising the question of whether 
a check constitutes a sufficient written promise to pay a debt dis-
charged in bankruptcy. After the defendant's obligation to the plain-
tiff had been discharged, he made oral promises to pay the debt out 
of an expected recovery from a tort claim against a third party. When 
the tort action was settled, the defendant instructed his attorney to 
make arrangements for payment of the discharged debt. His attorney 
drew a check payable to both the defendant and the plaintiff and de-
livered it to the defendant who indorsed it and gave it to the plaintiff. 
Soon thereafter the defendant asked his attorney to stop payment on 
4 !145 Mass. 434. 187 N.E.2d 820 (196!1). 
II See G.L., c. 106, §!l-ll8. 
§4.4. I !145 Mass. !l!l!I. 187 N.E.2d !171 (196!1). 
~4.!i. I 1963 Mass. Ad\". Sh. 609, 190 N.E.2d 77. 
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the check, which was accomplished before the plaintiff received pay-
ment. In this action the plaintiff argued that the attorney's signature, 
made as agent for the defendant, was sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirement that promises to pay a discharged debt be in writing. The 
Supreme .Judicial Court, demonstrating considerable facility in inter-
preting the Uniform Commercial Code, held that the drawer of a 
check makes a promise to pay the amount of the check to any holder 
and that this promise meets the requirements of the statute. 
Because of the necessity of tying together several sections of the 
Uniform Commercial Code to arrive at the conclusion that the drawer 
of a check makes a "promise" to pay, the Court's opinion has an appear-
ance of cleverness rather than depth. Since a check is basically a pay-
ment rather than a promissory instrument, initial reaction to the 
opinion is that the Court was more impressed by technicalities than by 
the underlying issue of whether this was the type of writing intended to 
satisfy the statute. But when it is remembered that the writing re-
quirement is primarily designed to assure that a promise was in fact 
made, it must be admitted that a check is as good evidence of this 
as can be obtained. Also, in the face of prior Massachusetts cases that 
have.held that an informal promise contained in a letter is sufficient,2 
it would be difficult to conclude that a check is less representative of 
the debtor's serious intent to promise payment of the barred claim. 
§4.6. Contracts between husbands and wives. In 1944, Frank W. 
Grinnell asked the question "Why not allow written contracts between 
husband and wife in Massachusetts?" 1 His own answer was a tenta-
tive draft act to permit such contracts, and his proposal was presently 
introduced into the Senate. However, the .Judicial Council found a 
reason to deny enforceability to contracts of husband and wife inter 
se: the possibility of fraud on creditors.2 
The argument of the Judicial Council delayed the legislation for 
some twenty years, but during the 1963 legislative session Mr. Grin-
nell's suggestion was adopted.3 Section 3 of Chapter 209 now provides: 
"Husbands and wives may make contracts with each other, written, 
oral, sealed or unsealed." 4 
2 See Nathan v. Leland, 195 Mass. 576, 79 N.E. 795 (1907); Cook v. Shearman, 105 
Mass. 21 (1869). 
§4.6. 129 Mass. L.Q., No. 2. p. 29 (1944). 
2 SO Mass. L.Q., No. 4, p. 20 (1945). 
a G.L~ c. 209, §5, as amended by Acts of 1965, c. 765, §2. 
4 The same act (Acu of 1963, c. 765) amended G.I .. , c. W9, §6, to permit suits by 
marriage pannen against one another on contracts permitted by G.L., c. 209, !j!I. 
